Visegrad Scholarship at the Vera & Donald Blinken Open Society Archive
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Supervisor: Katalin Székely
Final Report

Analogies between the contemporary Post-truth phenomena and similar symptoms of the Cold War era

–
Áron Kútvölgyi-Szabó

Background

In the last couple of years my artistic practice was dealing mainly with the doubtfulness of knowledge and specifically the uncertainty of image-based sources and the unconscious effects of cognitive distortions. Recently my interest has been shifted towards the symptoms of the Post-truth world and the parallelism of alternative facts and beliefs.

The role of spatiality is the key aspect I examine both theoretically and in practice for years now. Hence one of my essential strategy is to confront 2D imagery with the original 3D situations to emphasize the importance of spatial property and to point out the uncertain and manipulatable nature of fixed, perspective views, that can mislead the perception and the following interpretations.

In my proposed project I intended to grasp some of the analogies between the contemporary Post-truth phenomena and similar symptoms of the Cold War era, relying on mostly the archival materials of Blinken OSA. My approach during the research was driven by the concept of *artistic research*, which means that I was not strictly separating the theoretical and the creative aspects of my praxis and I was not intended using the research process merely as the foundation of new artworks but also through the creation of artworks I was hoping for some new insights, which would otherwise missed or couldn't really grasped by the toolset of language.

Finally, my research concluded in a case study which simulates the distinct methods of historical disinformation and contemporary fake news creation. By mimicking their toolsets, I was attempting to point out how selective framing and arbitrary linkage can create fake but seemingly plausible narratives in their own context.

Process

In an early stage of my research while I examined the photographs of Gabriel Bodnar, during the 1968 invasion of Kosice [HU OSA 391] I coincidentally found a small detail, which grabbed my attention. Four men were standing on the roof of an unfinished building, looking down on the

crowd and the marching tanks. Seemed like a casual, insignificant detail, but then it turned out, that they are present on other photos as well in a slightly different setup.

For the first sight I felt some strange suspiciousness about them, they seemed a bit odd somehow, inspiring me to look behind their presence. Finally, a hypothetical question appeared in my mind: what would the Soviet intelligence do if they would see these photos? Would it raise their suspicion as well? How would they interpret it? Especially in the light of their then present agenda which was meant to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia – namely: the CIA has developed a subversive plan, a sabotage in Czechoslovakia, which would end up in a NATO invasion if they don't intervene in time.

So I thought: let's try it out as a simulation, as a thought-experiment. Based on these photos and any other materials those intelligence agencies could theoretically use after the invasion, as a fictional "internal investigation".

Simulation 1

Following the basic protocol the first step would be the identification of the members within the group, then separately each member, since some of them had a clear distinguishing mark, like a hat (person B), a suit (person C), a cap with working clothes (person D).

After the reference photos were set and enhanced, the next step was to examine the whole series of the photos Bodnar took that day. While cross-referencing them based on their look and clothing, the "suspects" would likely appear accidentally in other photos from the series or in any additional material they could find from that certain date.

After thorough scrutiny, it turned out that is possible, that there were other members involved beyond the main group: like a photographer (person E) hiding one level below, or a man with glasses (person F) who appears in several photos – seemingly in personal contact with members of the main group. Also there were possible collaborators: a saboteur (person G), an agitator (person H) and a violent protester (person J). Although it's not clear that the former ones were whether part of the circle or they were just under influence of the main group.

Based on the photos they could have easily identify the location, the construction site of the later Hotel Slovan, in the nearby of the city center of Kosice.

At that time maybe it was clear for the investigators that the US had gathered information on Czechoslovakia since 1954. They were extensively monitoring every larger city, they could even map out the underground facilities built since 1949, and the military capacities of Czechoslovak troops. But the US intelligence could only achieve that if they have sent covert agents on the ground. So for the imaginary investigators, the "necessary presence" of the American covert agents in town and the 4 suspect above wouldn't be considered as a coincidence.

With this local knowledge, our main characters could disappear from the Hotel Slovan area easily, first mingled in the crowd, then most likely by using motorbikes. Afterwards they appeared in different parts of the town and seemingly coordinated the civilian protesters. They were possibly

encouraged the locals to stand up against the Soviet army, to attack the soldiers and their tanks with rocks and improvised weapons and to make barricades. Even though their presence is not well documented in the available photos their impact would likely be considered to traceable. As the main instigators of the opposition they were organizing “civilian“ marches and demonstrations and they were effectively assisted in the nonviolent resistance as well.

Later they were most likely traveled forward to Prague, where they continued their covert subversive actions, where they escalated the situations, setting the barricades on fire, and they could even fanaticize the youth to execute violent actions against the Soviet army. The investigators would map out that they were even following the book of sabotage techniques, like changing or destroying the street signs, giving the soldiers wrong directions all over Prague and on the way there. In the next few days, they were continue helping the protesters to create and distribute disinformations opposing the “good-intentioned Soviet help“ to prevent the Western-backed coup and possible NATO invasion against the Warsaw Pact countries.

So that's one probable way how a Soviet internal report would have possibly reveal the role of the subversive 4-member gang and their accomplices based on the photos available back then.

Simulation 2

In the second part I attempted to imagine how a campaign on the Prague Spring would appear in the Russian media today, especially on their online surfaces.

Even though the currently available memes on the Prague Spring are not explicitly indicate the involvement of the US, the overall suspicion around the CIA and it’s “dirty history“ is wildly present, and the topic is regularly appearing in both in official sources and in the alternative media spectrum.

Actually there were two cases when it resulted in political conflict. First in 2015, when a documentary film titled: *Warsaw Pact – Pages Declassified* was broadcasted on Russia’s state-run TV channel. Using the same narrative I was exploited in the first simulation, that the Soviets were just prevented the Western-backed coup and a possible NATO invasion against a Warsaw Pact country when they were invaded Czechoslovakia. The second time in 2017, TV Zvezda, the Russian Defense Ministry’s official media outlet published an article on their website, claiming basically the same, that they prevented the West from carrying out a coup in Czechoslovakia using the technology of ‘velvet’ revolutions.

This is the first time when “velvet and color revolutions“ came into the greater narrative, especially in the context of Euromaidan in Kiev. Since according to the Russian media the events in Ukraine had a direct connection to the CIA, their involvement became a widespread “knowledge“. With this in mind I chose this belief as a common platform to evaluate the events of the Prague Spring in retrospect. Even though this narrative was never exposed at large in the form of memes, but it can be easily imagined and “reproduced“ prior to it happens. Like what would an employee of the Internet Research Agency, operating in Saint Petersburg would do if he would have received an order to contextualize the Prague Spring now. What kind of instructions or tips he would get from his supervisor to make these memes work?

Regarding the image juxtapositions I created the following “tricks and tips“ would arise:

1. To enforce the connection between two separate events, use accidental visual symmetry to enhance the feel of similarity.
2. Focus on the seemingly main characters of the events to generalize their shadiness and suspiciousness.
3. It doesn’t necessarily have to depict the things in the same way, if it shares a common associative layer.
4. The jokes underpin the narrative better if they reduce the seriousness of the original cause. In that way an intense existential situation can easily become a “lazy gathering“.
5. Images as “frozen moments“ cannot contain the causality of events, they can look similar even when they have a completely opposite motivation / emotional background.
6. Shades of violence can be easily mixed up, and labeled as the “same“, even if one was a prepared and armed act and the other a more vulnerable form of resistance. One can say: “if there is no gun present on a picture, it doesn’t mean there weren’t at all“.
7. Use visual jokes based on resemblance to common pop-cultural genres. Like mimicking the cover of a music album of a 4-member rock band.
8. But it always works better if it's accompanied by another ironic / sarcastic layer (mostly a written one).

Findings

The findings of my research have two main segments: the first refers more to the original question – the analogies and similarities between the contemporary Post-truth phenomena and the Cold War era –, and the other is connected to the images as tools of manipulation.

The shared methods between the classical propaganda and the Post-truth tactics I discovered during my research:

- Mirroring: accusing the opponent with the very same thing what you’ve just done or about to do. They will have to defend themselves first and accuse you back, which is a much weaker position – feels like a “childish attitude“.
- Using fake news as a “Swiss-knife“, since it works in every stage of the process. In the preparation phase: as conditioning, as well as justification or the pretext for a later event. During the act: as a deception / confusion / distraction (classical disinformation). Afterwards: as interpretation / explanation. Also: inwards and outwards, to local and international audiences. You can cherry-pick data, connect the dots as you wish and come to whatever conclusion you desire, since fact-checker sites are way less effective to the public than the original (fake) news.
- False accusation still works. It doesn’t have to be true, because you won’t have to prove it later. In the Post-truth era: objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than the ones appeals to emotion and already existing personal beliefs, so it just has to resonate in the targeted group.
- It’s enough if you win the hearts you don’t necessarily have to win the minds too. Sympathy and antipathy are still key elements: if you are less popular, make your opponent at least as unpopular as you are.
- It’s enough if you raise suspicion and skepticism towards all the possible narratives and the truthfulness of your opponent. If you can’t dominate the narrative by yourself, don’t let anyone

else do. The objective in the post-truth era: is to muddy the waters and cast doubt upon the possibility of “objective truths“ in general.

During the simulations my primary focus was on the role of images. We all know that even if they are intact, they can be unreliable in some cases and they can be exploited easily along with our intentions. Also they can be easily modified and forged with manual and digital techniques – in which Russian were traditionally really good at.

But what I would like to point out here is referring to the nature of imagery: the framing. Not just in a sense that an image necessarily has a border, and it creates a fragment of reality, isolating and decontextualizing that fragment. But in a sense it always has an *angle*, it’s not neutral at all, since anything can be photographed in literally thousand different ways, resulting in a primary bias which we cannot by-pass. In addition to that, an image not just contains information but at the same time, it conceals others due to overlappings and the distortions of perspective.

Framing is to control attention, shaping perception. Especially in case of multiple images (an implicit or explicit) narrative is always formed automatically. What really matters is how you connect the dots, what you choose and what you neglect from the accessible materials – which is the field of cognitive biases. Which is deeply exploited by both the advertisement industry, the classical propaganda and also in the current fake news creation.

And of course, framing in a sense of *accusation* works seamlessly with images, since images and videos still act like “evidence“ or “proof“ for a lot a people. Especially graphic content can affect us more deeply and viscerally, we cannot really keep the critical distance if it's presented in a large amount in the same time. Maybe this is why Russia choose this unusual way of influence a travel photo-exhibition titled: *Material evidence.* Which was toured in Brussels and Berlin twice, and it was also exhibited in New York – besides Moscow of course.

In the context of political communication and propaganda: it has a theatrical aspect. It works as a *scenery*, due to its fixed viewpoint we cannot “look behind the scenes“, we can only rely on that frontal view. It’s always taken into consideration what will be shown to the public and what kind of effect will it trigger – it’s composed alongside the grater agenda or intention.

Since images cannot really “win over“ each other for good, they will always remain competing *parallel narratives*. I personally believe the solution lies in spatiality, in particular *spatial analysis,* the one which is used by the group named Forensic Architecture (based in London, at Goldsmith University). Their practice relies on the reconstruction of events in question by integrating back the image-based sources to their original 3D situation and timeframe. This results a greater clarity and can provide answers which none of the images can offer on their own. Their practice shows that puzzling the pieces in an ordinary way only ends up in a useful manner if the “big picture“ is not a picture at all, but a spatial model, which can be analyzed from all the possible viewpoints and aspects.

Appendix
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Part 1

HU OSA 391 Photographs of Gabriel Bodnar on the 1968 invasion of Kosice

More information: HU OSA 391



510

Narrative I.

1968

1.

2.



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

4.

Identification of the members

1.

2.

3.

4.

person A

male
cca. 185cm
30-40 year old
possibly blond

1.

2.



3.

4.

person B

male
170-180 cm
cca. 40 year old
dm: hat

1.



2.

3.

4.

person C

male
cca. 180cm
30-40 year old
dm: dark suit



1.

2.

3.

4.

person D

male
cca. 185cm
40-50 year old
dm: working clothes + cap



person A

person B

person C

person D

person A



person B



person C

person D



person E
(photographer)



person E
(photographer)

person F
civilian collaborator (messenger)



person G
civilian collaborator (saboteur)

person H
civilian collaborator (agitator)

person J
civilian collaborator (protester)





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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

50X1

REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY — Czechoslovakia

SUBJECT — City of Kosice

DATE DISTR. 25 AUG 1954

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

PLACE ACQUIRED

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE

DATE OF INFORMATION:

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

50X1

50X1

25X1X

1. Kosice is located near the Hungarian frontier. It had 70,000 inhabitants, of whom approximately 80% were Slovak and 20% Hungarian. Seventy per cent of the population spoke Hungarian.

2. The names of the streets [redacted] were correct as of 1949. However, they were changed often according to the political requirements of the moment. For example, immediately following World War II, Kosice had Churchill and Roosevelt Avenues, both of which have since been renamed.

3. The Hlavna ulica, Pestianska trieda, Majzisova ulica, Legionarske namestie, and Modlavska ulica were the main streets and therefore the widest. They were approximately 20 to 30 meters wide. Some of the streets were paved with asphalt and most of the others with cubical stone blocks.

4. The streetcar system of Kosice operated only on the main streets. It was in very bad operating shape with old reconditioned cars. The USSR removed what the Germans left, including repair facilities and replacement equipment.

5. The railroad station was the center of a network servicing Eastern Slovakia; Presov and Zilina to the north, and Michalangy and Cop to the south. Cop was the connecting point between Slovakia and Sub-Carpathia. The railroad station in Kosice also had large marshalling yards with numerous repair shops at the southern edge. A very large warehouse lined the tracks to the north of the yard. There was always a great number of locomotives stationed both in the repair yards and in the coal supply yards.

6. The Hornad River flowed from the north to the south along the eastern edge of the city. Its average depth was one meter and it was approximately 60 to 80 meters in width. There was a railroad bridge about

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S-E-C-R-E-T 25X1

COUNTRY Czechoslovakia

REPORT

SUBJECT Construction of Underground Buildings in Kosice

DATE DISTR. 21 MAY 1958

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES RD

D/GL

DATE OF INFO. 25X1

PLACE & DATE ACQ. 25X1

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

a reproduction of a map section of the Kosice area on which are pinpointed the locations of underground buildings constructed since 1949. The buildings are as follows:

1. Underground post office, under construction from 1952 to 1957, the work being carried out by Pozemne Stavby, Branch 01, Kosice; the construction had a secret designation, 033 Kosice, and it was directed by the architect Lastovecky (fnu). The post office is in the southern part of the town, near the old airfield, which is no longer in use, and west of the Kosice - Barca road, in the eastern slope of Obeseny vrch (hill), and to the south of Holubiho ulice, which runs along the north end of the cemetery to join the Kosice - Moldava road. The building, which is at the point where Holubiho ulice joins Barcanska ulice is 30 x 20 m., and has three floors, built of ferro-concrete, and camouflaged as a new swimming pool, the pool itself being next to it. During the construction, the builders came upon a large underground spring to the north of the building, which had to be drained away. The work of installation was carried out in 1957 by a group of fitters from the Kosice telegraph office on the corner of Rumanova and Komenskeho ulice, and a telephone switchboard, cables, and electrical and other equipment were put in. The building is to serve as an underground communication center for long-distance connections between the U.S.S.R. and Hungary and Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and will probably include an amplifying station and other requisites for the purpose. It is supposed to have been built to withstand atomic explosions. A similar installation has been erected in Roznava, likewise designated Construction 033, and constructed by Pozemne Stavby, Kosice.

CLOSURE ON ROUTING

S-E-C-R-E-T 25X1

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI		AEC						

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

M 32

a reproduction of a map section of the Kosice area on which are pinpointed the locations of underground buildings constructed since 1949. The buildings are as follows:

1. Underground post office, under construction from 1952 to 1957, the work being carried out by Pozemne Stavby, Branch 01, Kosice; the construction had a secret designation, 033 Kosice, and it was directed by the architect Lastovecky (fnu). The post office is in the southern part of the town, near the old airfield, which is no longer in use, and west of the Kosice - Barca road, in the eastern slope of Obeseny vrch (hill), and to the south of Holubiho ulice, which runs along the north end of the cemetery to join the Kosice - Moldava road. The building, which is at the point where Holubiho ulice joins Barcanska ulice is 30 x 20 m., and has three floors, built of ferro-concrete, and camouflaged as a new swimming pool, the pool itself being next to it. During the construction, the builders came upon a large underground spring to the north of the building, which had to be drained away. The work of installation was carried out in 1957 by a group of fitters from the Kosice telegraph office on the corner of Rumanova and Komenskeho ulice, and a telephone switchboard, cables, and electrical and other equipment were put in. The building is to serve as an underground communication center for long-distance connections between the U.S.S.R. and Hungary and Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and will probably include an amplifying station and other requisites for the purpose. It is supposed to have been built to withstand atomic explosions. A similar installation has been erected in Roznava, likewise designated Construction 033, and constructed by Pozemne Stavby, Kosice.

CLOSURE ON ROUTING


KOŠICE
(211)
CVIČIŠTĚ
Furca
Barca
(210)
Soetlá (Világoš)
ZAVODIŠTĚ
LETIŠTĚ
Sigmundova tn.
Hornád


So. Rozalia
KOŠICE
(211)
CVIČIŠTĚ
Hotel Slovan
str. cth.
kruh.
host.

X1

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

25X1

COUNTRY Czechoslovakia

X1

SUBJECT Troops at Košice

25X1

DATE DISTR. 3 MAY 1954

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS.

SUPP. TO REPORT NO.

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THIS IS **UNEVALUATED** INFORMATION

25X1

The following troops have been identified in Košice:

1. An army corps command (ZVV) in Mészáros Gasse, in the building formerly occupied by the Hungarian corps command.

2. A rifle regiment, in the barracks bounded by Postava, Moisesova and Kuzmira streets. The men wear red shoulder boards with a darker red rim. One battalion of this regiment is in the barracks in the Kuzamiro-Okruzna. It has about 700 men.

3. An AAA regiment in a barracks in the southern part of the town.

4. A mountain artillery regiment in the artillery barracks on Kukucinova Gasse The regiment is horse and mule-drawn.

5. A motorized artillery section /sic/ stationed in the former Hungarian Bem Jozsef barracks. It has about 750 men, and belongs to a new artillery regiment.

6. A horse-drawn train sectio. /sic/ in the former Hungarian Thokoly barracks, about 700 to 750 men strong.

7. A parachute regiment, whose command and staff are in the army corps barracks on Mészáros Gasse.

8. The 1st Battalion of this regiment is in the former artillery barracks at the corner of Kukuchinova and Djelostreicks streets. It has about 550 men. They are young, 18 to 20 years old. Even the cadres and members of the staff are not above 25. There are two jumping towers in the courtyard of the barracks, and basic training is conducted there.

SEE LAST PAGE FOR SUBJECT & AREA CODES

X1

SECRET

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

Prague

Prague

RESTAURACE

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

SIMPLE SABOTAGE FIELD MANUAL

Strategic Services

(Provisional)

STRATEGIC SERVICES FIELD MANUAL No. 3

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

(7) *Transportation: Automotive*

(a) Roads. Damage to roads [(3) below] is slow, and therefore impractical as a D-day or near D-day activity.

(1) Change sign posts at intersections and forks; the enemy will go the wrong way and it may be miles before he discovers his mistakes. In areas where traffic is composed primarily of enemy autos, trucks, and motor convoys of various kinds, remove danger signals from curves and intersections.

(2) When the enemy asks for directions, give him wrong information. Especially when enemy convoys are in the neighborhood, truck drivers can spread rumors and give false information about bridges being out, ferries closed, and detours lying ahead.



V PRAZE VE ČTVRTEK 22. SRPNA 1968 ROČNÍK XXIV. — ČÍSLO 233. — 80 HAL.

Svobodné slovo

LIST ČESKOSLOVENSKÉ STRANY SOCIALISTICKÉ — HOSTEL ŘÁDU PRÁCE

Prohlášení Československé strany socialistické

Jediné řešení - odchod vojsk

PŘEDSEDNICTVO ústředního výboru Československé strany socialistické se na svém mimořádném zasedání zabývalo vážnou situací, která nastala obsazením území Československé socialistické republiky spojeneckými vojsky Varšavské smlouvy. Přítomný ministr Kosatíkgin. Ze žádný ustanovení orgán ČSSR ani ani Tisou a Dubčekovo, ústavní předpisy.

Československá socialistická republika, stejně jako ostatní státy socialistického společenství, se opírá o pevné základy, které vytvořily dějiny. Jsou to základní principy svobody a demokracie, nezávislosti a suverenity, rovnoprávnosti a vzájemné výhodnosti ve vztazích mezi socialistickými státy, principy, které byly zakotveny v Košickém vládním programu a v ústavních zákonech, jež jsou základem našeho společenského a státního uspořádání.

Jako politická strana jsme vždy usilovali o to, aby naše společnost byla stále demokratičtější, aby každý občan mohl co nejvíce ovlivňovat veřejné dění, aby každý mohl svobodně vyjadřovat svůj názor a aby každý občan mohl kontrolovat činnost všech orgánů státní moci a státní správy. Jsme přesvědčeni, že jen na základě takové demokracie, jaká se vyvinula v posledních měsících, je možné budovat socialismus, který bude odpovídat našim podmínkám a potřebám.

Československý stát je suverénní socialistický stát založený na spolupráci a bratrském přátelství s ostatními socialistickými státy. Jsme přesvědčeni, že tato spolupráce je v zájmu všech socialistických států a že přispívá k upevňování celého socialistického společenství. Naše strana se vždy hlásila k internacionalismu v praxi a nikdy nedopustí, aby byl porušen.

Naše politika vychází z toho, že každý národ je odpovědný za osudy socialismu nejen u sebe doma, ale i v celém světě. Každý národ má právo a možnost rozhodovat o cestách svého rozvoje, ale žádné rozhodnutí nesmí být v rozporu se zájmy ostatních socialistických států, s mezinárodními dohodami, které jsme uzavřeli. Každý stát musí dbát o to, aby jeho politika a činnost nepoškozovaly ostatní socialistické státy, aby nevytvářely hrozbu pro jejich bezpečnost. Každý stát musí dbát o to, aby jeho politika a činnost nepoškozovaly ostatní socialistické státy, aby nevytvářely hrozbu pro jejich bezpečnost.

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U THANT
Sovětskému svazu

PRAVDA ZVÍTĚZÍ!

V okamžicích, kdy píšeme tyto řádky, přelétají nad redakcí Svobodného slova letadla, a na některých místech Prahy již stojí cizí obrněné stroje. Na Václavském náměstí se shlukují lidé kolem československé vlajky.

A právě v této chvíli nemůžeme stejně jako vy všichni, pokud vůbec budete tyto řádky číst, dělat cokoliv jiného, než zachovat alespoň vnější klid, a zároveň si pevně říci, že se nikdy nesmíme sami sobě, ideálům svobody a demokracie, k jejichž jménu vznikla Československá republika, ideálům svobody a demokracie, v nichž jsme vychovávali své děti, v nichž jsme chtěli žít a žili jsme znovu od ledna tohoto roku.

To je jediná cesta, jediná možnost. Vnitřní síla, jež naše národy zachovala v nejtěžších chvílích v minulosti a v níž je naděje pro nejbližší budoucnost člověka.

Bylo-li kdy třeba věrnosti principům svobody, demokracie a skutečného humanistického socialismu, pak je to tato chvíle. Proto podpořme, dokud je k tomu byť jen jediná šance, svobodně zvolené a národní národy uznané představitele — prezidenta Ludvíka Svobodu, jedinou legální vládu, pokrokové a s lidem spjaté politické vedení Národní fronty i všech čestných a demokratických komunistů i nekomunistů, vedení soustředěné kolem Alexandra Dubčeka.

Současně je zákazem těchto osudových chvil: odmítnout každou provokaci zevně i zevnitř! Nepřipustit, aby skompromitované elementy zneužily národní tragédie ke svému prospěchu! Odmítnout pomlouvání vedoucích osobností naší svobodné demokratické a socialistické společnosti šířené záměrně z některých sousedních zemí s cílem narušit důvěru a pevné spojení mezi vedením a lidem, které je nyní největší a možná jedinou naší zbraní!

V pevné naději. V pevné síle. V neskonalém odhodlání PRAVDA ZVÍTĚZÍ!

REDAKCE SVOBODNÉHO SLOVA

PROHLÁŠENÍ
presidenta republiky Ludvíka Svobody

PRAHA (ČTK) — Drazí spoluobčané, v posledních hodinách vznikla v naší zemi složitá situace. V současné chvíli vám nemohu říci více k jejímu objasnění, jako president Československé socialistické republiky se k vám obracím s plnou odpovědností, kterou jsem s přijetím této funkce převzal a odhodlán za žádnou, abych zachoval plnou svéprávnost a nepromyšlil.

U vědomí své občanské odpovědnosti a v zájmu naší republiky nedopustím, aby došlo k nepředstavitelným akcím. S důvěřujícím k lidem, kterou jsem projevoval v minulých dnech cyklejte dalších kroků ústavních orgánů republiky.

PROVOLÁNÍ
Národního shromáždění

Pokyn velvyslancům

Vláda zasedala

Volá Bělehrad

Part 2

THIS IS SOCIALISM
WITH A HUMAN FACE

What did Brezhnev say to Dubček when he started the Prague Spring?
TANKS A LOT!


Weird Photo Of The Day
A Soviet soldier chases man who had thrown stones at a tank, 1968.
imgflip.com

MAKE ART
OBEY
1945
1968
NOT WAR

PRAGUE SPRING
AWESOME
memegenerator.net

BACKING COUP D'ÉTATS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND STABLIZING THIRD WORLD
COUNTRIES SINCE 1947



Narrative II.

2018

PRAGUE, 1968
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
KIEV, 2013
IT TOOK THEM 45 YEARS TO LEARN HOW TO THROW A SMASHING PARTY

PRAGUE, 1968
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
KIEV, 2013
“THEY ARE JUST CIVILIAN PROTESTERS FIGHTING FOR THEIR COUNTRY” ...YEAH, SURE

PRAGUE, 1968
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
KIEV, 2013
SENDING SOME 'VACATION PHOTOS' TO THE GUYS BACK IN THE OFFICE (LANGLEY, VIRGINIA)

PRAGUE, 1968
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
KIEV, 2013
ENJOY, WHEN THE CIA ORGANISES YOU A DAY OFF

PRAGUE, 1968
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
KIEV, 2013
CIA ADVISORY TEAM ON TOUR IN EASTERN EUROPE

PRAGUE, 1968
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
KIEV, 2013
PEACEFULL PROTEST ...SUPPORTED BY THE CIA


PRAGUE SPRING
LATE SUMMER HITS
THE CZECHOSLOVAK UNIT
UNKNOWN B-SIDE SINGLES FROM THE SIXTIES

IMPROVISED PIECES FROM THE CIA ORCHESTRA

REMASTERED IN 2013, UKRAINE